CRA, Planners, and Neighborhood Development by Pascal, Erica
Erica Pascal
CRA, Planners, and
Neighborhood Development
Three years ago, the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) was enacted as Title VIII of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
(Public Law 95"128). The Act requires finan-
cial institutions to define their local service
area, and to detail the services they are pro-
viding for that area. Neighborhood organiza-
tions, fighting for years to end redlining and
credit discrimination in their neighborhoods,
saw the act as a great victory. Lenders viewed
the law as an anathema, and tantamount to
"credit allocation"; they claimed the next step
would be for the federal government to require
them to make imprudent loans. This article
examines the potential of CRA as a tool for
neighborhood revi tal i zat i on , and the role for
local planners in effectively using that tool
to encourage reinvestment in lov;er- i ncome
neighborhoods
.
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
The purpose of CRA, as explained by
Senator William Proxmire, the Bill's sponsor,
is "to require each appropriate federal finan-
cial supervisory agency to use its authority
when examining financial institutions to
encourage such institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered consistent with the safe
and sound operation of such institutions"
(CRA, 5802(b)). Those federal agencies
involved are the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, which regulates insured banks not
belonging to the Federal Reserve System, the
Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates
national banks, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board which regulates savings and loan associa-
tions, and the Federal Reserve Board which
regulates bank holding companies and banks that
belong to the Federal Reserve System.
The Act requires each lender to identify
its local community and explain how it is
serving the needs of that local community
"including low and moderate income
neighborhoods." The findings are published by
the lender in a CRA statement which must be
available for public inspection. The public
is free to comment on the Statement, and those
comments must be kept on file. The regulators,
in their periodic examination of the institu-
tion, use the CRA Statement and comments to
assess how the lender is meeting the credit
needs of its entire community.
The real thrust of CRA only becomes
apparent when a lender applies to its regulator
for a structural change, such as opening a new
branch facility, relocating an office, merging
with another institution, acquiring another
institution's assets or shares, or chartering
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a new institution. When considering the re-
quested change, the regulator makes a more
careful assessment of the lender's CRA obliga-
tions, taking into account such factors as the
willingness of the lender to ascertain local
credit needs, the geographic distribution of
the institution's loans (this data is required
by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975),
evidence of discriminatory credit practices,
participation in community development programs
(such as Neighborhood Housing Services, local
development corporations, community development
block grant programs, etc.), and participation
in government supported loans.
When an application for one of these struc-
tural changes is filed, public notice is given,
and the federal regulator must accept comments
from affected parties. These parties can be
other lenders, local government, civil rights
groups, public interest groups, or neighborhood
organizations, who file a "protest" or
"challenge" under CRA to the application. The
regulator is given wide discretion in the manner
of conducting the CRA assessment, but where
there is sufficient activity aroused by the
institution's application, hearings or negotia-
tions may be held, or a settlement sought.
The CRA settlement is the primary goal of
most organizations which challenge an applica-
tion; merely asking for denial of the applica-
tion is a lost opportunity. Many groups are
beginning to see the potential for negotiation
with their local lenders through the CRA
process. A CRA Guidebook, jointly written by
hud's Office of Neighborhoods, Voluntary
Association and Consumer Protection, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, the National Community
THE ACT REQUIRES EACH LENDER TO IDENTIFY ITS
LOCAL COMMUNITY AND EXPLAIN HOW IT IS SERVING
THE NEEDS OF THAT LOCAL COMMUNITY ..."
Development Association, and the Center for
Community Change includes chapters on "Using
CRA Analysis to Negotiate with Lenders" and a
"Model Loan Policy Agreement.'' These chapters
were based on a settlement reached by the
Adams Morgan Association, Perpetual Federal
Savings and Loan Association, and other
neighborhood groups in Washington, D.C.
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minority neighborhoods were not being met, and
asked the Federal regulator (in this case, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board) to deny the
application. A settlement was quickly reached
requiring First Federal to lend $15 million to
applicants within the City of Cleveland for
mortgages and home improvement loans over the
next two years. The City also let it be known
to other lenders that their performance was
being watched as well.
In New York, a challenge by South Brooklyn
Against Investment Discrimination (AID) to
Greater New York Savings Bank resulted in the
first denial of an application on CRA grounds.
Greater New York had applied for a new branch
facility in Manhattan, but the FDIC found that
the Bank's overall record indicated a lack of
commitment to its client neighborhood of
Brooklyn. Since that denial in April, 1979,
the Bank has launched aggressive lending pro-
grams in several New York City neighborhoods,
"the real THRUST OF CRA ONLY BECOMES APPARENT
WHEN A LENDER APPLIES TO ITS REGULATOR FOR A
STRUCTURAL CHANGE ..."
and parts of Brooklyn have been rediscovered
by the "brownston i ng" movement. AID has
become a major actor in monitoring bank per-
formance, filing challenges, and seeking
settlements. Quickly following on their
success with Greater New York, they reached
settlements with New York Bank for Savings and
Franklin Savings Bank, generating millions of
dollars of additional investment in Brooklyn
ne i ghborhoods.
Other organizations have also successfully
challenged the lenders. Legal Aid Foundation
of Los Angeles secured a pledge from Home
Federal Savings and Loan of San Diego to make
$3.5 million in loans per year in 1 ow- i ncome
neighborhoods. Wellston Association for
Community Organization Reform Now (ACORN) in
Missouri negotiated with Landmark Bancshares
for withdrawal of their challenge to Landmark's
acquisition of a small bank in exchange for
$1 million in investment in Wellston
neighborhoods.
However, far more challenges have failed--
in Toledo, Ohio; Philadelphia, PA; Buffalo, NY;
and Meridian, M i ss i ss
i
ppi --a 1 1 owi ng branches to
be closed, assets to be transferred, and the
deterioration of neighborhoods to continue.
Sympathy by regulators to CRA challenges is
not deep, and lenders are committed to pre-
venting neighborhood groups from encroaching
on their decision-making. A study of CRA
challenges being conducted by the Woodstock
Institute, a Chicago-based public interest
research group, shows the success of AID,
ACORN, Legal Aid, and the City of Cleveland
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to be the exception rather than the rule.
Clearly, the regulators are not interested in
denying a large number of applications based
on the challenges of non-bankers, despite the
obvious needs of neighborhoods for reinvestment.
Neither is there a clear understanding by the
regulators of how much can be required of
lenders without jeopardizing the "safety and
soundness" of the institution.
SOUTH SHORE BANK:
A NEIGHBORHOOD LENDING INSTITUTION
In 1973, the South Shore Banl< of Chicago
was purchased by a group of investors represent-
ing church groups, foundations, corporations
and individuals. That group, Illinois Neighbor-
hood Development Corporation, intended to demon-
strate that lenders could indeed go a long way
in reinvesting in a lower-income neighborhood
without jeopardizing the safety and soundness
of their institution. It intended to show that
responsibility to neighborhood credit needs
could be a way of doing business, and not a
grudging concession to neighborhood groups.
The South Shore area of Chicago is a
neighborhood that saw the classic scenario of
decline. Located eight miles from downtov/n, on
Chicago's lakefront, the neighborhood was
developed in the early part of the century as
a commuter suburb, white and middle class in
character. It enjoyed good transportation, the
most exclusive neighborhood shopping area in
the city, and such amenities as beaches, golf
courses and the elegant South Shore Country
Club. In the 1960s, however, in-migration of
minorities set off a cycle of disinvestment and
decline. Minority population grew from ]% in
i960 to 721 in 1970 and 35% in 1975- The change
was accompanied by the self-fulfilling prophe-
cies of racial transition: housing deteriorated
and was abandoned, local merchants fled, and the
quality of city services declined. The former
owners of the South Shore Bank cut back on cus-
Multifamily mortgages amounted to $4.8 million in the South Shore area by the end of 1979.
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tomer services and allowed the deposit base of
the Bank to decline to over 50^. When Illinois
Neighborhood Development Corporation purchased
the Bank in 1973, a study conducted by the
University of Chicago that year indicated that
South Shore residents felt that the neighbor-
hood would continue to deteriorate.
In 1980, this neighborhood of 80,000 people
still faces serious problems. Median family
income is $13,000, approximating the median for
the City of Chicago, and 20? of the residents
receive some form of public assistance. Housing
deterioration continues to be a serious problem,
and the six commercial strips in the neighbor-
hood contain numerous vacancies and marginal
businesses. Yet South Shore Bank has been able
to invest over $25 million in the neighborhood
with a delinquency and default rate on its
loans that are well within the norms for the
banking industry. And, a follow-up study by
the University of Chicago in 1979 indicated
that many residents feel that the neighborhood
has "turned around."
The experience of South Shore Bank should
indicate to other lenders that this type of
lending need not be viewed as an invitation to
bankruptcy. In the area of single family mort-
gage lending, for example, the Bank has invested
$11.8 million in South Shore homes and,
correspondingly, has seen home values in the
neighborhood double since 1973. An additional
$1.5 million has been invested in South Shore
housing through rehabi 1 Ttat i on loans. Multi-
family mortgage lending amounted to $'*.8 million
by the end of 1979. Neither the size of the
loans nor the criteria used in making lending
decisions is different from that applied by
other lenders, except that, rather than
writing off any area as too risky for invest-
"... THE REGULATORS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN
DENYING A LARGE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS BASED
ON THE CHALLENGES OF NON-BANKERS ..."
ment, the Bank has chosen to concentrate its
resources in the neighborhood, and has been
rewarded with a very stable mortgage loan
portfolio. Just as neighborhood decline is
often a self-fulfilling prophecy based on the
expectation of that decline, reinvestment can
build value. As an example of the way bank
lending can build value, multifamily building
purchases through South Shore Bank must
always be accompanied by a rehabilitation loan.
The major criteria in these rehab loans are
improvements to the structural soundness,
M *"
The South Shore Bank has invested over $25 million in the neighborhood.
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security, and energy efficiency of the building.
These improvements better insure the continued
viability of the bu i i d i ng (and, of course, the
Bank's collateral position as lender), and
improve the owner's ability to attract and
maintain tenants without pricing the apartments
out of the rental market for the neighborhood.
In 1978 and 1979, this type of lending affected
25 buildings containing 900 units of housing
in South Shore (about 2.5% of the neighborhood's
hous i ng stock)
.
At this rate of housing improvement,
however, change will indeed come slowly to
South Shore. Illinois Neighborhood Develop-
ment Corporation therefore developed another
subsidiary, City Lands Corporation, to increase
the pace of housing redevelopment in South
Shore. This year, they will begin the largest
current multifamily rehabilitation effort in
the country in partnership with two other
lender-affiliated redevelopment corporations
(RESCORP, owned by a consortium of Chicago
savings and loan associations, and First
Chicago Neighborhood Development Corporation,
a subsidiary of the First National Bank of
Chicago). The project will involve major
rehabilitation of 20 buildings containing 5^0
units in a concentrated four-block area in the
most deteriorated section of South Shore.
Small business lending is another area in
which South Shore Bank has concentrated its
energies and resources. Over $k.8 million in
commercial development loans have been made in
the neighborhood since 1973. The Bank has been
able to demonstrate that careful assistance to
borrowers, and creative loan structuring can
produce successful businesses in any
neighborhood. For example, the Bank retains
on its staff a sma 1 1 -bus i ness consultant,
whose role is to attract development oppor-
tunities to the neighborhood, and join them
with local entrepreneurs. She also assists
"... RESPONSIBILITY TO NEIGHBORHOOD CREDIT NEEDS
COULD BE A WAY OF DOING BUSINESS, AND NOT A
GRUDGING CONCESSION TO NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS."
local merchants seeking Bank financing with
store design, advertising and display, and pur-
chase and inventory systems. The goal of the
Bank is to produce new businesses which will
improve the appearance and quality of merchan-
dise on the neighborhood's commercial strips.
In loan structuring, the Bank has tried to
take advantage of every possible government
program to write down the cost of money to
borrowers, and to reduce the risk to the Bank.
The guaranty programs of the Small Business
Administration (SBA) have been extensively
used. Also, at Bank initiation, an SBA-licensed
local development company was formed by local
merchants. This company, the South Shore Area
Development Company, can secure low-cost funds
from the SBA for local merchants. In 1979,
nine businesses rece i ved a combi nat i on of Bank
and local development company financing of over
$1.2 mi 1 1 ion.
To provide local merchants with a con-
tinuing source of technical assistance, the
Bank was instrumental in helping the South
Shore Commission secure $55,000 in Community
Development Block Grant funds from the City of
Chicago for a Rev i ta I i za t ion Center. The
Center will assist neighborhood businesses with
problems ranging from bookkeeping to merchan-
dising and renovation, taking the same kind of
assistance offered by the Bank to a larger
aud i ence
.
Another area in which the Bank has
developed creative financing mechanisms is in
lending to community organizations. Community
groups, day care centers, clinics, and other
organizations which have government contracts
often have short-term cash flow problems
because of bureaucratic slowness. The Bank
"just as NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE IS OFTEN A SELF-
FULFILLING PROPHECY BASED ON THE EXPECTATION OF
THAT DECLINE, REINVESTMENT CAN BUILD VALUE."
has made a practice of advancing funds against
these contracts, to be repaid directly by an
assignment of the contract proceeds. Other
organizations have secured Bank loans with the
guaranty of local foundations, or the personal
guarantees of individuals involved with or
sympathetic to the organization. This type of
lending relieves many of the cash crises which
community groups regularly face, and allows
needed services to continue in the neighborhood.
Finally, the South Shore Bank has firmly
adopted the attitude that community responsi-
bility involves not only lending to the
neighborhood, but listening to the neighborhood.
The Bank regularly consults its Resident
Advisory Board on matters of Bank hours and
services, and neighborhood credit needs. Bank
staff have spoken before numerous community
organizations and block clubs in the neighbor-
hood, encouraging them to use Bank services
and attempting to dispel the image of not
caring about the neighborhood. In preparation
of its 1980 CRA statement, the Bank went to
organizations such as the South Shore Chamber
of Commerce, the South Shore Commission, and
the South Shore Ministerial Association for
their comments on Bank performance in the
neighborhood. The Presidents of the Resident
Advisory Board and the South Shore Commission
sit as voting members on the Board of Directors
of Illinois Neighborhood Development
Corporation.
spring 1980, vol. 6 no. 1 13
t^^ganf^
Despite sigrri-ficant investment, there are still aommeroial vacancies and marginally solvent
businesses. Photo courtesy of Walter S. Mitchell
APPLICABILITY OF THE SOUTH-
SHORE EXPERIENCE
The attitude of South Shore Bank toward its
local community has made it unique, but the
methods used by the Bank are available to any
financial institution interested in neighbor-
hood rev i tal i zat ion. Many lenders are begin-
ning to use the tools available, and to devote
resources and energy to programs aimed at
revitalizing lower-income and minority
ne ighborhoods
:
Since the first program was established
in 1968, Neighborhood Housing Services has
expanded to over 50 sites in 'tO cities. Money
to support both the operation of the program,
and the special loan fund, comes from local
financial institutions.
• Local development corporations, funded
by the Small Business Administration, have
grown dramatically in recent years. They pro-
vide low-cost money to local merchants as part
of a total financial package made in participa-
tion with local lenders.
• Neighborhood real estate development or
rehabilitation ventures such as City Lands and
RESCORP, are growing. In New York City,
Community Preservation Corporation has rehabi-
litated over 2300 units of multifamily housing
PLANNERS ALSO CAN PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPING CRA CHALLENGES."
in the past five years. CPC is owned by a
consortium of New York's largest lenders.
The Comptroller of the Currency has recently
granted permission to First National Bank of
Chicago and North Carolina National Bank to
form community development subsidiaries which
will direct their attention to low-income
neighborhoods
.
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• The Philadelphia Mortgage Plan has been
operating since 1975, before CRA and the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, to provide mortgages
in 1 ower- i ncome neighborhoods through a special
risk-sharing program initiated by a group of
local lenders.
There are many more examples of institu-
tions developing a sensitivity to neighborhoods
and neighborhood needs. At least some of this
recent interest is due to CRA, and lenders'
desire to avoid a potentially lengthy battle
with neighborhood groups and regulators.
Helping these lenders meet their affirmative
obligations toward neighborhoods is an
opportunity planners should not ignore, and
CRA is a wonderful tool to make sure they
listen. The experience of South Shore Bank
and other examples of lender involvement shows
that neighborhood reinvestment is probably less
risky than loans to Iran or REITs. What often
may be lacking on the part of lenders is the
knowledge of the possibilities for involvement,
their lack of expertise in using certain
programs, or the lack of a mediator between
lenders and neighborhood groups.
WHAT PLANNERS CAN DO
Today, interest rates are at unprecedented
levels. Inflation is pushing homeownersh ip
beyond the reach of most of the middle-class,
as well as lower-income home seekers. The
federal government's push for an austerity
budget will be felt in cutbacks to federal
programs for housing, and community and econo-
mic development. Clearly, we must begin to
develop new ways to implement programs and
continue the process of neighborhood revitali-
zation, and to translate neighborhood develop-
ment needs into credit programs.
First, planners can play a useful role to
financial institutions because they understand
government programs. The Small Business
Administration and the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration have loan guaranty programs; other
agencies have resources that can be tapped.
Lending the expertise of local government or
public interest planners to institutions will-
ing to undertake those programs can prove to
be a fruitful partnership.
Second, as the cost of using private funds
increases and the availability of public funds
diminishes, leveraging must become a way of
doing business. Community Development Block
Grant funds can be used to subsidize interest
rates, allowing lower-income families access
to mortgage and rehabilitation monies, or
allowing local merchants to expand their
businesses. These funds can also be used in a
grant/loan program, reducing the amount of the
loan and thereby the amount of debt, even v;ith
high interest rates. "Lump sum" deposits of
Community Development funds in a financial
institution earn income which can be applied
to neighborhood development programs. There
will no longer be enough public funds available
for planners to think solely in terms of
grantmaking; increasingly, we will have to
think about leveraging, development financing,
and capitalization.
A third role for planners is in analysis
and technical assistance. Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act data is publicly available and
can be used to identify lenders who are
deficient in their CRA performance. Local
governments also have data on home values,
neighborhood family income, analyses of
neighborhood needs, and other statistics com-
piled for federal government programs. If the
local government is unwilling to confront the
financial institutions itself (and a city may
not want to bite the hand that buys its bonds),
that information is at least available to
public interest groups and neighborhood organi-
zations who can use it to file their own CRA
challenges. The Northeast Ohio Areawide
Coordinating Agency, a regional planning
commission, chose that role to assist local
groups in defining their lending needs.
Planners also can provide technical assis-
tance to organizations developing CRA
challenges. One reason why some CRA challenges
have failed is that the regulators did not feel
they were substantiated, or that the organiza-
tion filing the challenge did not have a
clearly-defined settlement with which to
negotiate. After a settlement is reached,
there will often be a continuing need to
monitor the performance of the institution to
ensure that the credit needs of the neighbor-
hood are truly being met by the lender.
Finally, planners interested in neighbor-
hood rev i tal i zat ion should be planning for the
future. The need to be creative in developing
programs for neighborhood revi ta 1 i zat i on will
only increase. Certainly, CRA is one tool that
has enormous potential. Recently, South Shore
Bank calculated that the cost of its develop-
ment loan program in 1979 was $3-72 per person
in South Shore. At that cost, 25 of the
largest banks in the country, with assets of
$673 billion dollars, and earnings of $4.1
billion, could provide that same development
loan service to 16.7 million people.'
An opportunity like that should not be taken
1 ightly.
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